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RECENT CASES
was garnisheed; the garnishment was invalidated on the basis of Fuentes and
Sniadach in that there was no opportunity for early hearing and no participation in
the obtaining of an affidavit by a judicial officer. The Mitchell case was used as a
buttress for the Fuentes and Snaidach holdings, upon which the decision rested. 43
U.S.L.W. at 4194. Justice Stewart concurred at 43 U.S.L.W. 4194, celebrating the
reincarnation of Fuentes. Also concurring was Justice Powell, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4194-
4195, who stated that prejudgment remedy statutes should contain (1) posting of
adequate security bond by the creditor, (2) establishment before a neutral officer
of a factual basis for resorting to prejudgment seizure, (3) prompt post-garnishment
judicial hearing, and (4) provisions for the debtor to post security bond for return
of the goods seized.
However, a bitter dissent by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, 43 U.S.L.W. at
4196, complains that this matter has been before the Court three times in the past
three years and no adequate standard has been set. The Justices contend that Fuentes
was decided by a "bob-tailed court" and should have been reargued, rather than
leaving the apparent standard of a case-by-case determination. Justice Burger also
objected, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4198, to the case-by-case determination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Marriage Rights • Homosexuals and Transsexuals
B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974)
W HAT IS A MARRIAGE? Although there are several definitions,' they all
contain one common element: the union of one man and one woman.
However, if a particular state had no statute which specifically required
that marriage be between a man and a woman would the courts uphold
a marriage between members of the same sex? The New York Supreme
Court, in B. v. B.,2 answered that question in the negative. In that case
the wife brought an action for annulment on the ground that her husband
was a female, 3 and the husband attempted to amend his answer and
counterclaim for a divorce on the ground of abandonment. 4 The court
1"... the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law
for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally
incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." BLACK'S
LAw DiCTIONARY 1123 (4th rev. ed. 1968); "The institution whereby men and women
are joined in a special kind of social and legal dependence for the purpose of found-
ing and maintaining a family." WBSTER'S SEvENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DicTIONARY
518 (1966).
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ruled that the husband's counterclaim must fail,5 as there was in fact no
valid marriage between the two parties.6
An examination of the record shows that the husband is a
transsexual 7 who underwent a sexchange operation to change into the
body of a male.8 The rationale of the court was that since the husband
could not function as a male for the purpose of fulfilling the marriage
relationship,9 no valid marriage was entered into. This holding was based
in part on the same court's earlier decision in Anonymous v. Anonymous,
10
where it was held that marriage between males was a nullity, nothwith-
standing the fact that the "husband" believed the "wife" was a female at
the time of the ceremony, and notwithstanding that she may subsequently
have become one." Yet there is no New York statutory law or case
authority that defines male and female.' 2 Also, while there is no New York
law which expressly prohibits marriage between people of the same sex,'1
there is case law which states that marriage is a contract between a man
and a woman.' 4 It should be noted at this point that the B. v. B. decision
was technically a denial of an amendment to the "husband's" answer, and
a denial of the wife's crosss motion for a physical examination of the
"husband."' 5 Yet, although the decision was grounded on a rule of
procedure, the language used by the court to decide the procedural
question is significant, since the court could have just as easily decided the
procedural issue without going into its lengthy discussion about marriage.
Hence, the main thrust of the holding was that two people could not
legally be married unless they were of the opposite sex, even if they
desired to do so. Is such a holding proper when examined in the light
of constitutional considerations?
51d. atll6, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 716. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. 3025 § 15(b) (McKinney
1974). When matter to be added by the amended pleading is palpably insufficient or
immaterial, the court need not employ its discretion to grant the amendment and the
leave should be denied; accord, Norton v. Norton, 12 App. Div. 2d 1003, 211
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1961), where the proposed counterclaim attacking the validity of the
annulment of a former marriage was palpably insufficient.
678 Misc. 2d at 116, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
7 See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 148 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BARNETT] "Transsexuals are people who somehow learned a gender identity
in complete contradiction to their actual and apparent biological gender." See also
H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON (1966); R. J. STOLLER, SEX AND
GENDER (1968); G. TURTLE, OVR THE SEX BoRDER (1963); J. WALINDER, TRANS-
sEXUALISM (1967).
8 78 Misc. 2d at 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
9 The court found that the husband does not have a normal penis and in fact does
not have a penis which would enable the husband to perform as a man for the
purpose of procreation.
1067 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
11 Id. at 984, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
12B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 116, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712,716 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
13Id. See N.Y. DoM. REL.. §§ 1-7 (McKinney 1964).
14 E.g., Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1961).
1578 Misc. 2d at 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
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The concept of marriage as a bond between one man and one woman
was strongly fashioned by the early Church in an age which knew nothing
of modern behavioral science.16 It was believed that God made man and
woman in order to procreate, 17 and that each was endowed with an
instinctual attraction to members of the opposite sex.'8 Accordingly, all
laws and restrictions' 9 on marriage have presupposed that the parties to a
marriage would be of the opposite sex. This being the case, people of the
same sex or transsexuals who desire to marry, and who are prohibited
from doing so, may be denied equal protection under these laws.20
The courts have laid down two major tests when applying the equal
protection clause: the rational basis test, 21 and the compelling state interest
test.22 The former test, which is the traditional one, requires that when the
law treats people differently, this distinction must rest on some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 23 The compelling state interest
test is usually applied where there has been an infringement of a
fundamental interest by a rule, policy, or statute. 24 Only where there is
a compelling state interest shown for the classification or distinction will
the courts allow classes of people to be treated differently.2 No rational
16 BsNmTr, supra note 7, at 138.
17 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage as
the union of one man and one woman is as old as Genesis).
18 BARNETr, supra note 7, at 138.
19 See 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 369 (1968), wherein it is stated:
Restrictions imposed by law on the freedom to marry fall into the following
categories: 1) restrictions based on affinity or consanguinity precluding whole
classes of persons from intermarrying; 2) restrictions based on the presumed
incompetency of one of the parties to a marriage such as the lack of mental
competence; 3) restrictions based on the opposition of the parents of minor
children; 4) restrictions based on a policy requiring a mandatory waiting period
of six months or a year before a divorced person may remarry.
All these restrictions have policy reasons behind them, yet a restriction based on the
sex of the parties is not even mentioned nor is a policy reason for including such
a restriction mentioned.
20 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1,".. [nor shall any State] deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Compare with N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 11, "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof."
2 iSee e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2 2 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also
Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973).
24 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 (1972).
25ld. at 339. When the court decides that a classification is a "suspect" classification,
a compelling state interest must be shown by the state in order to uphold the
discriminatory state action. Sex is not a suspect classification, although four members
of the Supreme Court have declared it so. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). Other classifications which the courts have labeled as suspect are: race,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See also
Comment, Toward Sexual Equality? An Analysis of Frontiero v. Richardson, 59 IA.
L RaV. 377 (1973).
Winter, 1975)
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basis or compelling state interest was shown in B. v. B.28 On the contrary,
the only reason given for this seemingly invidious discrimination was that
marriage has always been thought of as between a man and a woman.
27
This decision, then, would appear to run contrary to the equal protection
guarantee, and the court's contention that they were only upholding the
status quo would fail in the light of Williams v. Illinois,28 which case
said ... Constitutional imperatives of the equal protection clause must
have priority over the comfortable convenience of the status quo." 2
In Baker v. Nelson30 the equal protection argument was applied in
an effort to obtain a marriage license ,by two males in Minnesota. 31 The
court held that since the statutes32 governing marriage do not authorize
marriages between persons of the same sex, such marriages are
prohibited.33 They went on to say that the equal protection clause was not
violated because one of the objectives of marriage is to procreate and
raise children; 34 therefore there was a rational basis for the discrimination.
Again, is there such a rational basis for the procreation of children that
the state will not permit persons of the same sex or transsexuals to marry?
The Baker court did not show why the ability (or inability) to
reproduce offspring should be one of the essential characteristics in
determining the validity of a marriage. Traditionally, large families were
common, since children were needed to work and help support the family.
Today these economic conditions have changed, yet according to Baker,
this ancient concept of the family has not changed with the times.
Another argument not mentioned in the Baker decision is that
sterility, the inability to bear children, does not affect the validity of the
marriage if the partners are capable of performing sexual intercourse.'
This lends support to the argument that the focal point of the validity of
a marriage should be something other than the ability to procreate.
In Griswold v. Connecticut' the Supreme Court ruled that the first
amendment has a penumbra which shades private activities from the glare
26 B. v. B.,78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974).
27 Id. at 116, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
28 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
29 Id. at 245.
SO 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
31 Id.
32 MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-517.08 (1969).
33291 Minn. at 311, 191 N.W.2d at 186. See generally, Comment, Homosexuality and
the Law-A Right to be Different, 38 ALBANY L. Rav. 84 (1973); Comment, The
Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687 (1973).
34291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
35 Stepanek v. Stepanek, 193 Cal. App. 2d 760, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1961); T. v. M.,
100 N.J. Super. 530, 542 A.2d 670 (1968); cf. Marks v. Marks, 191 Misc. 448, 77
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1948). But cf. Godfrey v. Shatwell, 38 N.J. Super. 501, 119
A.2d 479 (1955).
36 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[Vol. 8:2
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss2/7
REcrNT CAsEs
of governmental intrusion.3 7 In so doing, it overruled the Connecticut
Supreme Court 3 which had held that two Connecticut statutes prohibiting
the use of contraceptive devices3 9 were constitutional. The Supreme Court
also expounded a theory of marital privacy.40 Under this theory the
institution of marriage is protected by the Constitution from governmental
invasion since it is a sacred association based on the privacy of the
parties.41 It would seem that the New York court in B. v. B.42 has ignored
this doctrine by refusing to allow two people who are not of the opposite
sex to have a valid marriage. This result appears to be an even greater
restriction on the first amendment rights of marital privacy than the
Connecticut statute overturned in Griswold. Yet, the one case that
considered a similar problem, Jones v. Hallahan,'3 held that there was no
violation of constitutional rights in denying two females a marriage license. 44
The ruling continued by stating that no marriage license could be issued to
the appellants, since what the appellants proposed was not a marriage.45
The B. v. B. decision might have been decided differently had the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment been in effect. 46 This proposed
amendment is an attempt by Congress to treat the sexes equally under the
37 Id. at 483.
38 State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 554, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
39 The Connecticut statutes in question were CONN. GaN. STAT. REv. § 53-32 (1960),
"Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined...." and CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-196(1960), "Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires, or commands another
to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender." The director of a Planned Parenthood League was convicted of violating
these statutes when he gave information and advice about the means and methods of
preventing conception to a married couple.
40 381 U.S. at 486.
41 Id; see Mapp v.. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The right of privacy is one of the
fundamental rights reserved to the people; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55
Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
42 78 Misc. 2d at 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
43 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973). Two females were -denied a marriage license in
Kentucky because of their sex. They asserted that since the Kentucky statutes relating
to marriage, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.02, § 402.210 (1974), do not expressly state
that the parties must be of the opposite sex, then they may legally marry. The court
ruled that since no qualifications as to the sex of the partners to a marriage were put
forth in the statutes, then they would apply common usage and make the parties to
a marriage be one man and one woman.
44 501 S.W.2d at 588. Besides first amendment rights, the appellants also contended
that refusal of the marriage license subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment,
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
45 501 S.W.2d at 590.
46U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII [Proposed] "Equality of rights under the law shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex." This was
submitted by Congress for ratification on March 22, 1972, and must be ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the states. Compare with N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 13
[Proposed] "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
state of New York or any subdivision thereof on account of sex." This is to be
referred to the New York legislature of 1975. New York ratified the proposed federal
equal rights amendment on May 3, 1972.
Winter, 1975]
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laws;' 7 therefore if a state only recognizes as valid a marriage between
two people of the opposite sex, such may be a form of discrimination
based on sex. Pennsylvania, relying on the equal rights provision in its
Constitution similar to the proposed federal amendment, has struck down
laws which discriminate on the basis of sex. In Wiegand v. Wiegand 48 the
Pennsylvania court struck down a provision of the Pennsylvania divorce
law which gave wives, but not husbands, the right to receive alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees. In upholding the supremacy of their
constitutional amendment, 49 they stated that to treat individuals or classes
of individuals differently on the basis of sex, without having a rational
reason to do so, is unconstitutional. 50
Although there is no real restriction per se upon two people of any
sex who wish to live together, the legalization of the living together by the
ceremony of marriage does have its advantages. The most practical
advantage lies in the area of federal taxes. A married person may save
money by filing a joint income tax return with his spouse.5' Tax savings
are also afforded to married individuals under the "gift-splitting"
provisions of the federal gift tax.5 2 Furthermore, estate tax savings can be
realized by application of the "marital deduction" provisions of the
federal estate tax.53 Another advantage is that an association of two
people, formally and legally recognized by law and society, gives added
security and privacy to both parties of the association.
Sometimes the status quo is deemed by so many people to be the only
acceptable way to do or achieve a certain goal that they refuse to look at
the consequences or alternatives. The present view of the institution of
marriage may be a good example of this. The idea that marriage is to be
only between one man and one woman may be too firmly implanted in the
minds of the American people to be easily changed. Yet, how can
the courts balance this fixed notion about marriage with the interests and
rights of two people of the same sex, or transsexuals, who desire to enjoy
the associational and legal benefits of marriage? The answer may be to
create a separate, legally recognized and approved association which has
all the benefits of marriage, but which includes people of the same sex or
transsexuals. It seems that since the courts, by their decisions, display a
clear reluctance to act, the task of combatting outmoded social ideas in
the area of private human relationships may fall on the legislative branch.
It is hoped that such action will be soon forthcoming.
WILLIAM D. LENTZ
47H.R.J. REs. 208, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); SJ. Ras. 8, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
48226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973). The relevant divorce statutes are PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 and § 46 (1955).
49PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see 8 U. AKRON L. REv. 171 (1974).
50226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973); cf. Brown, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
51 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1973, § lao with § 1(c).
52 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2513 and 2523.
53 See INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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